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COMMUNITY PREFERENCE IN NEW YORK CITY 
Catherine Hart* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
New York City (“the City” or “NYC”) is one of the most segregated 
metropolitan areas in the United States.1  “[M]unicipal and 
neighborhood segregation didn’t just drop from the sky,” nor is it 
purely the result of self-selection and the workings of the economic 
marketplace.2  Rather, this problem “was created by explicitly 
discriminatory conduct [on] the part of both public and private actors 
over the course of decades.”3  Years of state condoned discrimination 
have resulted in, and continue to permit, major racial disparities in 
education, employment, and beyond.4  The plaintiffs in Winfield v. City 
of New York, Janell Winfield, Tracey Stewart, and Shauna Noel 
(“Plaintiffs”) brought a lawsuit against the City in July 2015 to contest 
New York City’s subtle, but potentially discriminatory “community 
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      1   For example, a study by the University of Michigan that examines the 1990-2010 
decennial census suggests that the New York metropolitan area is second only to 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin in metro areas with a population greater than 500,000 in terms 
of the residential segregation of blacks and whites.  William H. Frey, Brookings 
Institution and University of Michigan Social Science Data Analysis Network’s Analysis of 
1990, 2000, and 2010 Census Decennial Censuses, POPULATION STUD. CTR., 
http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/dis/census/segregation2010.html (last visited Feb. 27, 
2017).  See also Complaint ¶¶ 40–41, Winfield v. City of New York, No. 1:15-cv-05236 
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2015) (“Among the largest cities in 2010, New York City was still the 
second most segregated in terms of the dissimilarity index as measured between 
African-Americans and whites. Among the largest cities in the United States in 1980, 
New York City was the fourth most segregated in terms of the dissimilarity index as 
measured between Latinos and whites.”) [hereinafter Compl.]. 
 2  Daniel Denvir, The Ten Most Segregated Urban Areas in America, SALON (March 29, 
2011), http://www.salon.com/2011/03/29/most_segregated_cities/slide_show/9 
(quoting Craig Gurian, executive director of the Anti-Discrimination Center).   
 3  Id.  
 4  For example, a recent Civil Rights Project at UCLA concluded that New York 
City has the most segregated schools in the country.  John Kucsera & Gary Orfield, New 
York State’s Extreme School Segregation: Inequality, Inaction and a Damaged Future, 
ESCHOLARSHIP U. OF CAL. (March 26, 2014), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5cx4b 
8pf. 
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preference” policy.5  Enacted under Mayor Ed Koch in 1988, the policy 
currently provides a 50% preference to residents of a community 
district in the lottery system for affordable housing constructed in their 
district.6 
New York City is also the most expensive city in the world to live 
in.7  The burden to find affordable housing falls most heavily on low 
income residents, many of whom are African-American or Latino.  The 
Fair Housing Act (FHA), passed in 1968, declared that the government 
has an obligation to affirmatively further access to fair housing across 
the country.8  This mandate, however, has not been fully realized.9  
Nevertheless, the policies and regulations of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) should not allow, let alone 
encourage, discriminatory practices of any kind.  However, plaintiffs 
Winfield, Stewart, and Noel contend that this is exactly what is 
happening: the women allege that New York City’s housing policies, 
specifically its lottery system for low-income housing, perpetuates a 
pattern of residential segregation.10  Effectively, African-Americans and 
Latinos are unable to move to more privileged areas because they 
never had the opportunity to live there in the first place.  Therefore, 
this results in the systematic denial of opportunities to low-income New 
York City residents of color. 
The City maintains that the community preference policy was not 
a deliberate or backhanded attempt to discriminate against its black 
and Latino residents.11  Rather, the City enacted the community 
preference policy to curb the negative effects of gentrification, most 
 
 5  See Compl., supra note 1. 
 6  Id. ¶ 3. 
 7  Nick Timiraos, The Most Expensive Place in the World to Live, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 
22, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/09/22/the-most-expensive-place-
in-the-world-to-live/.  The prices of goods and services are only higher in two cities, 
Zurich and Geneva, but both were less expensive once rent entered the equation.  See 
id. 
 8  Although the Supreme Court has not found that housing is a fundamental right 
under the Constitution, the efforts of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) certainly illustrate the importance of this issue.  See Lindsey v. 
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). 
 9  See generally Austin W. King, Affirmatively Further: Reviving the Fair Housing Act’s 
Integrationist Purpose, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2182 (2013) (arguing that most state and local 
governments have “rarely risen above mere boilerplate” in meeting their obligation to 
affirmatively further fair housing.) 
 10  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 6. 
 11  See generally Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, 
Winfield v. City of New York, No. 1:15-cv-05236 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2015) [hereinafter 
Def. Br.]. 
HART (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017  1:07 PM 
2017] COMMENT 883 
notably, the displacement of long-time residents.12  Gentrification is 
rapidly devouring affordable housing options for many City residents, 
and most of these displaced residents are people of color.13  The City 
initiated the community preference policy so that local residents would 
have the opportunity to remain in their communities as rents rise and 
neighborhoods develop.14  Therefore, the City is concerned that an 
important policy tool, used to maintain “stable, diverse neighborhoods 
in the face of continuing gentrification and housing price increases,” 
may be threatened.15 
This comment will examine contemporary affordable housing 
policies in New York City that seek to achieve urban integration.  
Specifically, this comment will analyze the Winfield case and its 
challenge to the “community preference” or “outsider-restriction” 
policy, alongside efforts to control gentrification in the wake of the 
recent Supreme Court decision concerning disparate impact liability 
in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc.  Part II of this comment will address the 
community preference policy and tell the story of the ongoing Winfield 
lawsuit and its subsequent procedural history.  Part III of this comment 
will focus on the history of residential segregation and racial inequality 
in New York City and help illustrate how and why it remains so 
segregated today.  Part IV will discuss legal precedent relevant to the 
Winfield case, specifically the Supreme Court’s holding in the Inclusive 
Communities case, as well as new HUD regulations regarding disparate 
impact.  Finally, Part V offers a view of how this case should be decided, 
and explores the practical implications of the future of integrative 
policies in housing in New York City.  Ultimately this comment will 
argue that regardless of what happens in court, a revised and improved 
policy is necessary to not only appease both sides, but also to 
adequately work towards a more integrated New York City. 
There is an obvious tension at play here, but also a convergence.  
While the arguments on both sides have merit, the City, these women, 
and many of their peers want to ensure the same thing to citizens of 
New York: choice.  Low-income residents of color—encumbered by 
decades of government condoned discrimination, outright racism, 
 
 12  Rafael Cestero, An Inclusionary Tool Created by Low-Income Communities for Low-
Income Communities, NYU FURMAN CTR. (Nov. 2015), http://furmancenter.org/res 
earch/iri/essay/an-inclusionary-tool-created-by-low-income-communities-for-low-
income-commu.  
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
 15  Id.  
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and the lingering effects of such policies and practices—are entitled to 
a real choice about where to live.  Concerns about displacement mirror 
concerns about being stuck in a disadvantaged neighborhood because 
they both strip NYC residents of their autonomy. 
II. THE POLICY, THE COMPLAINT & THE LAWSUIT 
A. Outsider-Restriction Policy a.k.a. “Community Preference” 
In 1988, as Mayor Koch led the initiative to restore vacant 
buildings in various neighborhoods throughout New York, the City 
introduced the community preference policy.16  Under this plan, the 
City provided a 30% preference to residents of a community district 
where new affordable housing developments were built.17  As it stands 
today, however, the community preference policy requires that 50% of 
affordable housing units be set aside in the housing lottery for 
residents of the local community districts.18 
As rents rose and it became increasingly difficult to afford to live 
in certain neighborhoods, this policy allowed the City to protect 
historical enclaves such as Chinatown and Harlem.19  Both Mayors 
Michael Bloomberg and Rudolph Giuliani continued to enforce this 
policy, and it remains viable under Mayor Bill de Blasio today.20  
According to the Plaintiffs, the City has rejected proposals to eliminate 
this policy since at least 2005.21  Although Mayor de Blasio chooses not 
to comment on the lawsuit, he stands by the policy as “very fair.”22 
Our current policy is leading to a huge amount of new 
 
 16  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 81; Laura Kusisto, City Housing Rules Examined, WALL 
STREET J. (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hud-reviews-new-york-city-
affordable-housing-policy-1424399380; see also Emily Nonko, Redlining: How One Racist, 
Depression Era Policy Still Shapes New York Real Estate, BRICK UNDERGROUND (Nov. 5, 
2015), http://www.brickunderground.com/blog/2015/10/history_of_redlining 
(discussing Mayor Koch’s plan to revitalize parts of the city that had been subject to 
abandonment, arson, and disinvestment over the previous two decades through an 
ambitious affordable housing initiative). 
 17  Kusisto, supra note 16. 
 18  See Compl., supra note 1. 
 19  Kusisto, supra note 16. 
 20  Id.  Former housing commissioner, Jerilyn Perine, was quoted saying, “People 
in communities who take a stand to make it better, aren’t these the people who we 
want to have remain?” Id. 
 21  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 138. 
 22  Mayor Bill de Blasio, Mayor of N.Y., Mayor de Blasio Announces a Record-
Breaking 20,325 Affordable Apartments and Homes Financed in Last Fiscal Year, 
Enough for 50,000 New Yorkers (July 13, 2015),  
http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/484-15/transcript-mayor-de-blasio-
record-breaking-20-325-affordable-apartments-homes. 
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affordable housing and preserved affordable housing. We 
believe this policy is going to increase the likelihood of a 
more integrated city. We believe it’s fair, also, because it 
recognizes the opportunity for local residents to receive 
some of this affordable housing, but also maintains a share 
of the affordable housing for anyone in the city. So we think 
it’s a very balanced plan that maximizes opportunity and will 
help us move forward on fair housing. So we stand by it.23 
When asked about the challenges this policy may pose for 
integration, the Mayor did not answer the question and instead 
directed attention at the need to ensure access to affordable housing 
to people within their communities.24 
Despite the Mayor’s positive endorsement, there is no evidence 
that the City has ever evaluated whether this policy actually perpetuates 
residential segregation.25  Without any form of monitoring or 
evaluation by the City, in 2002, the Bloomberg administration 
increased the preference percentage to 50%.26  This policy has 
remained unchanged since 2002, and the Plaintiffs therefore take issue 
with the City’s failure to determine the policy’s effects on residential 
segregation.27  Moreover, the City continues to operate this policy 
despite the fact that City staff have never received instructions on how 
this policy may affect integration, or how it relates to the goal of 
affirmatively furthering fair housing.28 
Of the remaining 50% that is not “preferred” for local residents, 
the government also makes available an additional 12% to protect 
certain groups: 5% goes to applicants with mobility impairments, 5% 
to applicants who are municipal employees, and 2% for applicants with 
visual or auditory impairments.29  Therefore, only 38% of affordable 
units are available without restriction to every applicant.30  Additionally, 
the community preference policy does not require a resident of a 
district to have lived in that area for any specific amount of time.31  
Thus, a person who lives in a community district for one day has the 
 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 82. 
 26  Id. ¶¶ 83–85; see also JULIE MENIN, CHAIRPERSON MANHATTAN COMMUNITY BOARD 
1 AFFORDABLE HOUSING TASK FORCE JUNE 2011, AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN LOWER 
MANHATTAN 16 (2011), http://www.nyc.gov/html/mancb1/downloads/pdf/About 
_District/AH_REPORT.pdf.  
 27  Compl., supra note 1, ¶¶ 85–87.  
 28  Id. ¶ 156. 
 29  Id. ¶¶ 88–89; MENIN, supra note 26, at 16.   
 30  Id.  
 31  Compl., supra note 1, ¶¶ 92–95; MENIN, supra note 26, at 16.   
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same opportunity as a second-generation resident who has called that 
neighborhood home for his whole life and may have “persevered 
through years of unfavorable housing conditions.”32 
Regardless of how the City resolves this lawsuit, one potentially 
valuable outcome is that it may actually pressure the City to evaluate 
this mechanism. 
B. Complaint 
Ms. Winfield, an African-American resident of Manhattan, 
entered the lottery for affordable housing units in Manhattan 
Community Districts 5, 6, and 7.33  Similarly, Ms. Stewart, an African-
American resident of Brooklyn, entered the lottery for a place to live 
in Manhattan Community District 5.34  Likewise, Ms. Noel, an African-
American resident of Queens, entered the lottery to obtain a home in 
Manhattan Community Districts 6 and 7.35  As affordable housing 
applicants, these numbers have significance to the three named 
Plaintiffs in the lawsuit.  New York City is broken down into fifty-nine 
community districts.36  The women requested to live in community 
districts that are disproportionately white and considered 
“neighborhoods of opportunity.”37  The Plaintiffs’ complaint defines a 
“neighborhood of opportunity” as one with “high quality schools, 
health care access, and employment opportunities; well-maintained 
parks and other amenities; and relatively low crime rates.”38  The City 
did not select any of these three women to be interviewed for units in 
these areas; however, all of them continue to be interested in and 
intend to continue to apply for affordable homes,39 including those in 
“neighborhoods of opportunity.”40 
On July 7, 2015, these women filed a complaint against the City of 
New York in the Southern District of New York41 that alleged NYC’s 
community preference policy perpetuates residential segregation on 
the basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin.42  More specifically, the 
Complaint alleged that “the City has given and continues to give 
 
 32  MENIN, supra note 26, at 16.   
 33  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 13. 
 34  Id. ¶ 14. 
 35  Id. ¶ 15. 
 36  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 47. 
 37  Id. ¶ 100. 
 38  Id. ¶ 7. 
 39  Id. ¶¶ 13–15. 
 40  Id. ¶ 7. 
 41  This case is currently pending before Federal Judge Laura Taylor Swain.  
 42  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 1. 
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preference in [the] affordable housing lottery . . . based on 
residency.”43  The Plaintiffs, with the help of the Anti-Discrimination 
Center (ADC), challenged the City’s “community preference” policy.44  
The result, Plaintiffs allege, is that this policy continues to entrench 
segregation whereby access to neighborhoods with low crime rates and 
high educational, health, and employment opportunities are 
“effectively prioritized for white residents who already live there and 
limited for African-American and Latino New Yorkers who do not.”45  
Effectively, African-Americans and Latinos who currently reside in 
particular neighborhoods in the City are further restricted from 
moving to wealthier, safer neighborhoods because they never had the 
chance to acquire residency in the first place. As a result, minorities 
continue to be systematically denied access to opportunities that 
remain commonly available in predominantly white neighborhoods. 
C. Subsequent Filings & Arguments 
On October 2, 2015, the City moved to dismiss the lawsuit, 
asserting the Plaintiffs’ lack of standing to sue in federal court.46  The 
court’s determination of this issue is crucial,47 but if the court finds the 
Plaintiffs have standing,48 then the court will assess the viability of 
 
 43  Id. ¶ 7. 
 44  In their complaint, the Plaintiffs refer to this policy as the “outsider-restriction 
policy.”  Id.  For the purposes of this comment, I will refer primarily to it by the name 
the City has given the policy, “community preference.”  The City calls this “community 
preference,” as it is aimed to allow people to remain in the community where they 
come from; the Plaintiffs call this “outsider-restriction policy,” as it keeps out people 
who hope to call a safer, more affluent neighborhood their home.  Id. 
 45  Id. 
 46  See Def. Br., supra note 11. 
 47  The Supreme Court in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs 
emphasized the importance of a ruling at the pleading stage. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015).  “A plaintiff 
who fails to allege facts at the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence 
demonstrating a causal connection cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate 
impact.”  Id.  Although there has not yet been an opportunity for discovery, the facts 
alleged likely provide sufficient material to proceed. 
 48  As a threshold matter, the City argues that the Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs lack standing.  See Def. Br., supra note 11.  In its 
motion to dismiss, the City points to New York State Real Property Tax Law, Section 
421-a, which functions similarly to the community preference policy but on a state 
level.  See Def. Br., supra note 11, at 10.  The City argues that the buildings the Plaintiffs 
applied to are governed by the State policy, not the City policy.  Id.   
The Plaintiffs assert that the City relied on its own policy, not the State policy because 
Section 421-a only applies if a federal law, like the FHA, does not preempt it.  Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition of Motion to Dismiss at 10–16, Winfield v. City of 
New York, No. 1:15-cv-05236 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2015) [hereinafter Pl. Opp. Br.].  
Because the FHA has advanced regulations to affirmatively further fair housing and 
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Plaintiffs’ three legal theories: (1) disparate impact; (2) perpetuation 
of segregation; and (3) disparate treatment. 
1. The Theory of Disparate Impact 
The FHA forbids discrimination against “any person in the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in a provision 
of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”49  The Plaintiffs 
therefore assert that the outsider restriction policy caused Plaintiffs “to 
suffer a disparate impact based on race in the opportunity to compete 
for affordable housing opportunities.”50  In 2015, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the disparate impact standard.51 
The Second Circuit maintains that to establish a prima facie case, 
plaintiff must show: (1) facially neutral practices and (2) a 
“significantly adverse or disproportionate impact” that has resulted 
from defendant’s practices, but it does not require a showing of 
intent.52 
In their complaint, Plaintiffs point to statistics to illustrate the 
extent of segregation in the City.  The 2010 Census indicates that 
approximately 22.8% of the NYC population is African-American.53  
Seventeen community districts (there are fifty-nine total districts in 
Manhattan) have an African-American population over 50%, and six 
 
overcome patterns of segregation, Plaintiffs maintain that the State does not actually 
require this policy, which puts it back in the bounds of City authority.  See Pl. Opp. Br. 
At 11. 
Plaintiffs further emphasized the severity of their potential future injury if the 
community preference policy remains intact.  See Pl. Opp. Br. At 11. “[A] person who 
is likely to suffer [a discriminatory] injury need not wait until the discriminatory effect 
has been felt before bringing a suit.”  LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 425 
(2d Cir. 1995).  It was the “missed opportunity to compete for suburban housing on 
an equal footing with local residents,” that consisted injury, not the failure to obtain 
actual housing assistance.  Pl. Opp. Br. at 20.  In this case, it was the missed opportunity 
to compete for housing in neighborhoods of opportunity that constitutes their injury, 
and this lost opportunity is easier to show. Id. 
This is an important threshold issue, but in the event that the judge dismisses the 
motion at this stage, Plaintiffs have a few potential alternatives.  Plaintiffs could re-file 
a complaint after December 21, 2015, when the state law is no longer in affect, or 
simply apply to a different housing development and bring the suit if and when they 
are rejected again. 
 49  42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012). 
 50  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 184. 
 51  See generally Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2510; discussion 
infra Part IV.B. 
 52  Tsombanids v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 575 (2d Cir. 2003). See also 
Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2513. 
 53  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 49. 
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have an African-American population greater than 65%.54  To 
demonstrate the extent of residential segregation, Plaintiffs compare 
where 50% of the citywide population of major racial groups live.55  For 
example, 50% of Caucasians live in less than one quarter of the City’s 
community districts, whereas 50% of African-Americans live in only 
approximately 15% of the City’s community districts.56  The “center of 
gravity,” where approximately 50% of the black population lives in New 
York City, only consists of nine of the fifty-nine districts.57  The 
equivalent white “center of gravity” consists of thirteen districts.58  Not 
one of the twenty-two “centers of gravity” community districts overlaps.  
Not a single district is a “center of gravity” district for both races.59  The 
Plaintiffs further note that residential segregation exists not only 
among the general population of New York City, but also specifically 
among low income households that are eligible for affordable 
housing.60  The Plaintiffs link this and other statistical data to the 
outsider restriction policy.61  The Plaintiffs contend that because there 
are more affordable housing applicants residing outside local 
communities than inside, outsiders are less likely to be selected for an 
available affordable housing unit.62  Plaintiffs maintain that, if the City 
abolished this community preference policy, applicants could compete 
for these units on equal terms, which would consequently reduce racial 
segregation in the City.63 
In its motion to dismiss, the City argues that Plaintiffs failed to 
allege facts that constitute disparate impact, and that the statistical 
analysis they put forward does not demonstrate a causal link between 
the City’s policy and racial segregation in New York City.64  The City 
claims that Plaintiffs have only cited broad statistics about general 
segregation in New York City and therefore have failed to prove that 
the challenged policy actually causes segregation and other 
disparities.65 
 
 54  Id. ¶¶ 50–51. 
 55  Id. ¶76. 
 56  Id.  
 57  New York City Outsider-Restriction Policy Challenged, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CTR., 
http://www.antibiaslaw.com/orp (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 61. 
 61  Id. ¶ 7. 
 62  Id. ¶100. 
 63  Id. ¶¶ 8–10. 
 64  Def. Br., supra note 11, at 11. 
 65  Id. at 11–15. 
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In response, Plaintiffs maintain that the facts alleged far exceed 
the low bar required at the pleading stage.66  Relying on statistical data 
set forth in the brief, the Plaintiffs reiterate that it is “predictable that 
the ultimate racial composition of that housing will be less African-
American than if the policy did not exist.”67  They once again 
emphasize that the ultimate focus is not the bottom line result, but the 
impact on the practice itself, that African-Americans are at a 
disproportionate disadvantage to attain housing in neighborhoods of 
opportunity.68  “[T]he outsider-restriction policy effectively caps 
African-American participation at more than 50 percent of what it 
would otherwise be and places a floor under white participation in 
these districts at 100 percent plus the extent of overrepresentation.”69 
2. Theory of Perpetuation of Segregation 
Under their second theory, Plaintiffs assert that the outsider 
restriction policy perpetuates residential segregation based on race in 
New York City in violation of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(17).70  To 
successfully plead this cause of action, the 
mere existence of a statistical imbalance . . . is not alone 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case . . . unless the 
general population is shown to be the relevant pool for 
comparison, the imbalance is shown to be statistically 
significant and there is an identifiable policy or practice or 
group of policies or practices that allegedly causes the 
imbalance.71  
Moreover, the Second Circuit has recognized that the FHA prohibits 
“harm to the community generally by the perpetuation of 
segregation.”72 
Plaintiffs allege that to truly see the effect of racial segregation, it 
requires examination on the community district level.73  Although 
22.8% of the City’s population is black, there are seventeen community 
districts where the black population is less than 5%.74  Similar to the 
disparate impact claim, Plaintiffs argue that if the City eliminates the 
 
 66  Pl. Opp. Br., supra note 48, at 23. 
 67  Id. at 26. 
 68  Id. at 27. 
 69  Id. at 29. 
 70  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 186. 
 71  N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(17)(b). 
 72  Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
 73  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 48. 
 74  Id. ¶¶49–50. 
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outsider restriction policy, it would allow applicants to compete for 
affordable housing on equal terms regardless of their current 
address.75  Plaintiffs assert that this would reduce racial segregation in 
the City.  In contrast, the City once again asserts that Plaintiffs have not 
pled sufficient facts and the analysis is not robust enough.76 
3. Theory of Disparate Treatment 
Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the City’s outsider restriction policy 
constitutes “intentional discrimination on the basis of race”77 pursuant 
to 2 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).  To establish a prima 
facie showing of such disparate treatment, the plaintiffs must show that 
“animus against the protected group was a significant factor” of the 
responsible decision-maker’s installment of this policy.78  The court will 
look to five factors to determine if intentional racial discrimination 
motivated the challenged policy: “(1) the discriminatory impact of the 
governmental decision; (2) the decision’s historical background; (3) 
the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision; 
(4) departures from the normal procedural sequences; and (5) 
departures from normal substantive criteria.”79  The Plaintiffs argue 
that the City’s outsider restriction policy constitutes intentional 
discrimination because its decision to “establish, maintain, and expand 
the policy”80 was made with knowledge of a history of discrimination 
and segregation, which evidences rejection of more pro-integrative 
alternatives, and is thus “reflective of the City’s consciousness of what 
policies it thought that particular racial and ethnic groups ‘wanted.’”81  
The City contends that Plaintiffs have not alleged that the City 
intentionally treated Plaintiffs differently based on race, and the fact 
they identify as African-Americans is not enough to connect data to 
these allegations.82 
 
 
 
 75  Id. ¶ 101. 
 76  Def. Br., supra note 11, at 11. 
 77  Id. ¶ 188. 
 78  Smith v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 410 F. App’x 404, 406 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 79  Tsombanids v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 580 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 80  Daniel Beebe, New York City Defends its Community Preference Policy, DORSEY & 
WHITNEY LLP (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-york-city-
defends-its-community-13412/. 
 81  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 8. 
 82  See generally id.  
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D. Conclusions 
The City maintains that the Plaintiffs’ statistical analysis is 
inadequate even under the Supreme Court’s recent affirmation of the 
FHA.83  This assertion provides insight into how New York City’s law 
department interprets its obligations under the FHA, and also 
indicates what extent of statistical analysis is adequate—or 
inadequate.84  Nevertheless, Plaintiffs do have sufficient evidence to 
survive at the pleading stage.  These statistics present alarming 
examples of segregation in the City, and the Court need not look far 
to see the negative implications that are apparent in educational and 
workforce data.  Even if the Court does not find that the community 
preference policy contributes to residential segregation, this 
challenge, especially in regard to the City’s failure to review the policy, 
merits a response.  City leaders ought to address the concerns of their 
residents, and therefore, even an unsuccessful suit can still have a 
positive impact on the New York City community. 
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Until the 1960s, federal, state, and local governments 
purposefully enacted and subsidized de jure housing segregation 
nationwide.85  These policies required, actively promoted, and 
condoned racial discrimination in housing.86  In particular, “redlining” 
caused patterns of segregation to develop in the City, and the harmful, 
unjust implications remain in effect today.  Ironically, these very 
patterns have set the stage for gentrification, which only leads to 
displacement and further segregation.87 
A. Redlining 
One of the first programs to serve this interest was the Home 
Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC).88  Passed in 1933, HOLC was the 
first government-sponsored program that introduced the use of the 
“long-term, self-amortizing mortgage with uniform payments” on a 
 
 83  Def. Br., supra note 11, at 11. 
 84  Beebe, supra note 80. 
 85  See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) [hereinafter AMERICAN 
APARTHEID].   
 86  Id. 
 87  Emily Nonko, Redlining: How One Racist, Depression-Era Policy Still Shapes New York 
Real Estate, BRICK UNDERGROUND: THE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO NYC REAL ESTATE (Nov. 5, 
2015), http://www.brickunderground.com/blog/2015/10/history_of_redlining. 
 88  AMERICAN APARTHEID, supra note 85, at 51. 
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mass scale.89  American citizens were eager to seek assistance, and about 
40% of all qualified mortgage properties took advantage of the 
program, supplying over three billion dollars from 1933 to 1935.90 
In 1935, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board asked HOLC to 
create “Residential Security Maps” in 239 cities, including New York.91  
HOLC developed the rating system to evaluate “risks” of lending in a 
given neighborhood and determine eligibility for home loans and 
mortgage guarantees.92  It established four categories, ranging from A, 
the safest for investments, to D, the riskiest.93  The highest-rated areas 
were marked in green and consisted of those areas with new, well-
planned buildings and homogeneous populations.94 
These rankings considered the age and condition of the buildings 
in a neighborhood, but the most important factor “‘was the level of 
racial, ethnic, and economic homogeneity,’” and whether a 
neighborhood consisted of a “‘lower grade population.’”95  In effect, a 
neighborhood was considered high risk merely if black and Latino 
people resided there.96 
“Desirable” neighborhoods were predominantly inhabited by 
white professionals and remained in demand in good and bad times.97  
Throughout the five boroughs of the City, green neighborhoods were 
rare, but some examples include: Brooklyn Heights, Inwood, 
Riverdale, the Upper East Side, and a few blocks of Forest Hills, 
Queens.98  Second on the list, blue areas, were still considered “good,” 
but not nearly as desirable. 99  These included neighborhoods such as 
Bay Ridge or the Upper West Side.100  Yellow areas were deemed 
essentially undesirable; these typically bordered red areas and were 
 
 89  Id.  
 90  Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Historical and Legal 
Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617, 62021 
(1999). 
 91  Rachel D. Godsil, Post-Zoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land Use Controls: The 
Gentrification Trigger: Autonomy, Mobility, and Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 
BROOK. L. REV. 319, 330 (2013).  
 92  Id. 
 93  AMERICAN APARTHEID, supra note 85, at 51; Godsil, supra note 91, at 330. 
 94  AMERICAN APARTHEID, supra note 85, at 51; Godsil, supra note 91, at 330. 
 95  Godsil, supra note 91, at 33031 (citing THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE 
URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT 44 (1996)).   
 96  Id. at 331. 
 97  AMERICAN APARTHEID, supra note 85, at 51. 
 98  Nonko, supra note 87. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. 
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and in transition or declining.101  The final category was outlined in 
red; this is where the majority of African-Americans and other 
minorities lived and—as a result of this policy—had little mobility to 
leave.  Huge areas of New York were redlined: much of North 
Brooklyn, Cobble Hill, Gowanaus, Sunset Park, Dumbo, Fort Green, 
Bedford Stuyvesant, East New York, Coney Island, parts of Chinatown 
and the Lower East Side, Chelsea, much of the far east side up to 96th 
Street, Harlem, south and central Bronx, Astoria, Queens, Corona, 
Jamaica, and the area surrounding JFK International Airport.102 
Residents of neighborhoods burdened with a C or D ranking 
could not obtain loans to purchase or improve their homes because 
the Federal Housing Administration would not insure their 
mortgages.103  Likewise, banks and other lenders were advised not to 
make real estate investments in redlined areas, and therefore 
developers were unable to find funding to build in these areas.104  
HOLC systematically undervalued old, African-American and racially 
mixed neighborhoods.105 
With so few areas marked green in New York City, much of the 
white population was encouraged to move into the suburbs.  These 
areas were considered safer for home investment and were attached to 
buyer friendly terms such as smaller down payments and 30-year 
payment plans.106  African-Americans, on the other hand, were unable 
to obtain mortgages to buy homes in their NYC neighborhoods.107  
Consequently, New York City property owners in redlined areas were 
often unable to invest in “their properties and [the] neighborhoods 
fell into decline.”108 
These policies were not income-based.109  African-Americans and 
Latinos who could afford to buy homes and receive financing were 
denied mortgages in a way that similarly situated, middle-income 
whites were not.110  Today, many of these redlined neighborhoods 
remain some of the most dangerous and high poverty areas in the 
city.111  The irony, of course, is that these are also some of the 
 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Godsil, supra note 91, at 331. 
 104  Godsil, supra note 91, at 331; Nonko, supra note 87. 
 105  AMERICAN APARTHEID, supra note 85, at 51. 
 106  Nonko, supra note 87. 
 107  Id.; see also Godsil, supra note 91, at 331. 
 108  Nonko, supra note 87; see also Godsil, supra note 91, at 331. 
 109  Godsil, supra note 91, at 331. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Nonko, supra note 87. 
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neighborhoods most rapidly gentrifying and experiencing swells in 
rental rates.112 
Today, racial segregation continues to distort normal market 
dynamics nationwide.  Black families own fewer homes than any other 
racial group.113  The homes black families do own generally have less 
market value.114  The consequences of this impact future 
generationsfewer black families are able to transfer economic 
advantages to their children.115  This effect does not stop at one person, 
family, generation or neighborhood.  A huge swath of the population 
cannot achieve economic prosperity116 and persistence of residential 
segregation deprives people of essential opportunities and services.117  
This problem is worsened by the fact that most residents cannot afford 
to move to improving or gentrifying neighborhoods with ease.118 
The Court has consistently recognized the intrinsic value in self-
worth in circumstances analogous to residential segregation.119  These 
 
 112  Id. 
 113  Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, Residential Vacancies and 
Homeownership in the Third Quarter 2014 at 9 (Oct. 28, 2014) (on file at U.S. Census 
Bureau). 
 114  Thomas Shapiro et al., The Roots of the Widening Racial Wealth Gap: Explaining the 
Black-White Economic Divide, in INSTITUTE ON ASSETS AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (2013). 
 115  See Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting, Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 131371), 2014 WL 7477679 at *14 (citing PATRICK 
SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD 
RACIAL EQUALITY 115 (2013)) [hereinafter Brief for NAACP]; see also THE GEOGRAPHY 
OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 310 (Xavier 
de Souza Briggs, ed., 2005). 
 116  Brief for NAACP, supra note 115, at *14. 
 117  The persistence of segregated neighborhoods has negative implications.  
School segregation is closely linked to housing segregation.  Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. 
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111 n.24 (1979).  The consequences of segregation have 
long-term and potentially devastating consequences on a child’s ability to receive a 
quality education.  See Richard Rothstein, Segregated Housing, Segregated Schools, 
EDUCATION WEEK (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/03/26 
/26rothstein_ep.h33.html; Brief for NAACP, supra note 115, at *11.  Moreover, adults 
are deprived of meaningful professional opportunities.  See generally ELIZABETH 
ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 3 (2010) (“Segregation . . . isolates 
disadvantaged groups from access to public and private resources, from sources of 
human and cultural capital, and from the social networks that govern access to jobs, 
business connections, and political influence.”).  See also Brief for Respondents at 14, 
Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 
(2015) (No. 131371), 2014 WL 7477679 at *11. 
 118  Brief for NAACP, supra note 115, at *15–16. (citing Kyle Crowder et al., 
Neighborhood Diversity, Metropolitan Constraints, and Household Migration, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 
3, 32553 (2012)). 
 119  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (discussing the dignity 
of individuals and same-sex marriages); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
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principles apply with equal force here.  “Segregated housing and lack 
of agency in housing decisions imposes a host of harmful conditions, 
connotations, and constraints that disrespect the inherent self-
determination and dignity to which each individual is entitled.”120 
IV.  RELEVANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Fair Housing Act 
On April 11, 1968, just one week after the assassination of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Fair 
Housing Act into law.121  The context of its passage illustrates its dual 
purpose: the FHA was enacted both to forbid individual acts of private 
and public discrimination as well as to eradicate systematic 
segregation.122  The FHA proclaimed the end of generations of legal 
discrimination in housing on the basis of race, religion, and national 
origin.123  In addition, the FHA announced a positive obligation to 
“affirmatively” further fair housing.124  Although the statute does not 
expressly refer to “integration,” the legislative history125 and subsequent 
case law endorses that the intent and purpose of the FHA was 
residential integration.126  This second goal, to mandate residential 
 
851 (1992) (analyzing the decisional autonomy and dignity in the course of “personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education”); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (discussing the 
inherent dignity of people who have intellectual disabilities); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (discussing the dignity of intimate relationships). 
 120  Brief for NAACP, supra note 115, at *17. 
 121  U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., History of Fair Housing, http://portal.hud 
.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/h
istory (last visited Feb. 28, 2017). 
 122  See King, supra note 9, at 2184 (citing U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL 
DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 2 
(1968)).  
 123  Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
360119 (2006). 
 124  42 U.S.C. §§ 3608(d), (e)(5) (stating that the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development and all executive departments and agencies shall administer housing 
programs in a manner that “affirmatively” furthers fair housing). 
 125  See 114 CONG. REC. 3421, 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale); see also id. 
at 2278 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) (criticizing “the present outrageous and 
heartbreaking racial living patterns which lie at the core of the tragedy of the American 
city and the alienation of good people from good people because of the utter 
irrelevancy of color”). 
 126  King, supra note 9, at 2184 n.9 (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 
U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (endorsing statement Sen. Mondale’s statement about legislative 
history); see also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 299 (1976) (noting that the “wrong 
committed by HUD confined the respondents to segregated public housing”). 
Likewise, lower courts are in agreement.  See, e.g., Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 57677 
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integration, has been underdeveloped and underutilized.127  Although 
the recent holding from Texas Department of Housing & Community 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. simply reaffirmed what lower 
courts had been applying for years, because it requires people to truly 
take race into account when constructing new units or enacting 
policies, it will hopefully encourage Americans to more vigorously 
enforce the FHA and fully realize its potential to integrate this 
nation.128 
B. Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc. 
On June 25, 2015, the United States Supreme Court held that 
application of disparate impact is cognizable under the FHA.129  “In 
contrast to a disparate-treatment case, where a ‘plaintiff must establish 
that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive,’ a plaintiff 
that brings a disparate-impact claim challenges practices that have a 
‘disproportionately adverse effect on minorities’ and are otherwise 
unjustified by a legitimate rationale.”130  This affirmation of the 
disparate impact analysis in the context of housing is relevant to how 
the Court will assess Winfield, and further, to what extent the FHA can 
be used in the future to affirmatively further fair housing and 
residential integration. 
The Supreme Court heard this case just last year, but by this point, 
eleven of the twelve courts of appeals had decided on the issue and 
nine held that violations of the FHA may be established through a 
disparate impact standard of proof.131  Moreover, the HUD regulation 
 
(2d Cir. 1975) (citing legislative history that endorses integration as a goal); Otero v. 
N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Action must be taken to 
fulfill, as much as possible, the goal of open, integrated residential housing patterns 
and to prevent the increase of segregation.”). 
 127  See generally King, supra note 9, at 2182 (arguing that to reinvigorate the Act’s 
positive purpose, the United States must expand the “federal rule to define 
meaningfully this obligation through concrete, quantitative benchmarks”). 
 128  Ariane de Vogue, Court Upholds Key Tool to Combat Housing Discrimination, CNN 
(June 25, 2015, 5:29 PM) http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/23/politics/fair-housing-
act-texas-supreme-court/ (“Attorney General Loretta Lynch said the Justice 
Department will make use of this ruling in the future . . . ‘to vigorously enforce the 
Fair Housing Act with every tool at its disposal.’”). 
 129  Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2510 (2015). 
 130  Id. at 2513 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009)).  Although 
the Supreme Court has held that disparate impact is not cognizable under the 14th 
Amendment of the Constitution, certain federal laws have disparate impact provisions.  
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 131  Joe Rich & Thomas Silverstein, Symposium: The case for disparate impact under the 
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passed in 2013, which will be discussed in detail later in this section, 
also called for disparate impact analysis.132  Although Justice Kennedy 
affirmed the trend set by lower courts, his opinion actually places some 
limitations on the use of disparate impact analysis in practice. 
The underlying dispute concerned a decision about where the 
City of Dallas should construct low-income housing: the inner city or 
the surrounding suburbs.133  The respondent, the Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc. (ICP), a Texas-based non-profit 
corporation that helps low-income families obtain affordable housing, 
argued that the Petitioner, Texas Department of Housing & 
Community Affairs (the “Department”), which distributes the tax 
credits, allocated too many tax credits to developers who built in 
predominantly African-American inner-city areas, and too few tax 
credits to builders who developed in chiefly white suburban 
neighborhoods.134  Therefore, ICP alleged that the Department’s 
policies maintained a continued pattern of segregated housing.135  The 
District Court found the statistical evidence compelling enough to 
establish a prima facie showing of disparate impact136 and held in favor 
of ICP. 
The Supreme Court was specifically interested in the phrase 
“otherwise make unavailable.”  Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for 
the majority,137 focused on the use of this phrase and noted that it 
“refers to the consequences of actions and not just to the mindset of 
 
Fair Housing Act, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 6, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com 
/2015/01/symposium-the-case-for-disparate-impact-under-the-fair-housing-act/; see 
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935–36 (2d Cir. 1988); 
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 1977); Smith v. Clarkton, 
682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 
(5th Cir. 1986); Arthur v. Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574–75 (6th Cir. 1986); Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 1974); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 
1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Marengo Cty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 
1559, n.20 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 132  See infra Part IV.C. 
 133  Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2513. 
 134  Id. at 2510. 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. at 2514 (finding that “from 1999–2008, [the Department] approved tax 
credits for 49.7% of proposed non-elderly units in 0% to 9.9% Caucasian areas, but 
only approved 37.4% of proposed non-elderly units in 90% to 100% Caucasian 
areas. . . “92.29% of [low-income housing tax credit] units in the city of Dallas were 
located in census tracts with less than 50% Caucasian residents”). 
 137  Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, 
Elena Kagan, and Stephen Breyer.  Justice Samuel Alito dissented, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.  Justice Thomas also 
separately dissented.  
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actors.”138  The Court analogized this phrase to the use of “otherwise 
adversely affect” found in sections of Title VII and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).139  The Court’s decisions 
in Griggs v. Duke Power Company and Smith v. City of Jackson, likewise 
considered such language as indicative of Congressional intent to 
proscribe action that has a disparate impact.140  The use of “‘otherwise’ 
signals a shift in emphasis from an actor’s intent to the consequences 
of his actions. . . . [T]he operative text looks to results and plays an 
identical role: as a catchall phrase, located at the end of a lengthy 
sentence that begins with prohibitions on disparate treatment.”141 
Although the majority’s opinion clearly affirmed the use of 
disparate impact analysis and looked like a “win” for many fair housing 
advocates, it also imposed significant limits and could act as a “stern 
warning” rather than a “ringing reaffirmation” in practice.142  The 
Court announced that disparate-impact liability must be controlled in 
a number of ways.143  For example, a disparate impact claim that relies 
merely on statistical disparity will fail if the plaintiff cannot show that 
 
 138   Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2547 (2015).   
 139  Id. at 2510–11. 
 140  Id. at 2516–17; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  
 141  Id. at 2511.  Justice Kennedy further relied on the post-enactment history of the 
FHA.  By this time, nine of the eleven courts of appeals that addressed this issue 
concluded that the FHA includes disparate impact claims.  Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. 
Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2519.  Aware of this near “unanimous precedent,” Congress made 
a “considered judgment to retain the relevant statute” and therefore accepted and 
ratified the courts of appeals’ holdings.  Id.  Hence, if a word or phrase in a statute was 
given a uniform interpretation by inferior courts, the later version of that same act 
which retains the same wording presumptively carries forward that interpretation.  Id. 
at 2520. 
The Court found additional support for its conclusion in the 1988 FHA amendments.  
Id.  These three amendments contain three exceptions to liability that assume courts 
must enforce disparate impact liability.  These exceptions are in regard to appraisals, 
drug convictions, and occupancy restrictions.  Id.  Such exceptions would be 
“superfluous if Congress had assumed that disparate-impact liability did not exist 
under the FHA.”  Id.  
Finally, the Court acknowledged the legislative intent of the FHA and recognized that 
disparate impact claims are consistent with the central purpose of the FHA.  Id.  Similar 
to Title VII and the ADEA, the FHA was enacted to end discriminatory practices.  The 
Court noted that unlawful practices, such as zoning laws and other similar housing 
restrictions frequently “function to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods 
without sufficient justification.”  Id. at 252122. The Court reasoned that disparate 
impact liability might be exactly what is necessary to overcome the significant and 
disparaging discriminatory practices America currently faces.  
 142  Garret Epps, The US Supreme Court Barely Saves the Fair Housing Act, THE ATLANTIC 
(June 25, 2015) http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/the-supreme-
court-barely-saves-the-fair-housing-act/396902/.  
 143  Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
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defendant’s policies caused that disparity.144  This “robust causality 
requirement ensures that ‘[r]acial imbalance . . . does not, without 
more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact’” and therefore 
safeguards defendants who find themselves in an unfortunate 
setting.145  It is not yet clear how lower courts will interpret this 
requirement, but it has the potential to restrict the disparate impact 
analysis.146  The Court urged the use of these “adequate safeguards” to 
prevent governmental and private entities from using numerical 
quotas that could inevitably raise serious constitutional questions.147 
Disparate impact liability mandates that the government remove 
arbitrary and unnecessary hurdles, but it does not mandate that 
housing authorities actually affirmatively reorganize their policies.  
However, the FHA does require actors to take positive steps to further 
fair housing.148  Justice Kennedy, conversely, focused his analysis on the 
developer’s ability to avoid putting forward policies that have 
arbitrarily discriminatory effects.149  In fact, the Court stated that 
housing authorities and private developers should even be afforded 
“leeway to explain the valid interest served by their policies.”150  The 
Court compares this to the “business necessity” standard under Title 
VII which allows for a workplace requirement that may cause a 
disparate impact so long as the requirement is a “reasonable 
measure[ment] of job performance.”151  Likewise, a housing authority 
may preserve a policy if it achieves a valid interest.152  With the second 
mandate of the FHA in mind, it will be on the lower courts to diligently 
 
 144  Id. 
 145  Id. at 2523 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 
(1989)).   
 146  Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive Communities: What’s 
New and What’s Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106 (2015), http://columbialawreview 
.org/content/fair-housing-litigation-after-inclusive-communities-whats-new-and-
whats-not/. 
 147  The state may not impose or pursue race or gender quotas.  See, e.g., Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 488 
U.S. 469 (1989); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244 (2003).  In the private sector, if an employer pursues a numerical quota based 
on race or gender, it is suspect under Title VII.  See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193 (1979); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 64042 (1987).  More 
recently, the Court held invalid under Title VII employer actions that could lead to a 
“de facto quota.”  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 148  King, supra note 9, at 218586 (noting the procedural nature of current 
policies, and the need to shift to more substantive changes to enforce this mandate). 
 149  Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2522.  
 150  Id.   
 151  Id. at 2523 (quoting Griggs, 91 S. Ct. at 436). 
 152  Id. at 2523.  
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enforce Inclusive Communities to satisfy the FHA objectives within the 
confines of Inclusive Communities. 
The Winfield case is only at the pleading stage, and therefore it is 
impossible to know for certain whether it will survive the motion to 
dismiss.  The Inclusive Communities Court, however, pointed to the 
importance of this stage of the proceedings.153  The plausibility 
standard requires that the Court disregard all conclusory allegations, 
including legal allegations.154  Therefore, the Court will have to look at 
the statistical facts and narratives Plaintiffs have advanced rather than 
their legal conclusions about disparate impact, which are not entitled 
to the presumption of truth.  A plaintiff’s case will fail unless he can 
allege facts at the pleading state or produce statistical evidence that 
demonstrates a causal connection, and such limitations, the Court 
reasoned, are necessary to defend against abusive claims.155  “If the 
specter of disparate-impact litigation” triggers private developers to 
halt renovation and construction of low-income housing units, the 
FHA will have “undermined its own purpose as well as the free-market 
system.”156 
Kennedy concluded “we must remain wary of policies that reduce 
homeowners to nothing more than their race.”157  The social, 
economic, and political inequalities that result from racial housing 
inequality suggest that a focus on race may be the only way to overcome 
such disparities.  Such a conclusion, however, implies that any claim 
that falls outside of the “heartland,” such as “zoning laws and other 
housing restrictions that function unfairly to exclude minorities from 
certain neighborhoods without sufficient justification”158 would be 
without a strong claim.  While these particular plaintiffs in Inclusive 
Communities have the facts to overcome Kennedy’s statistical hurdle, 
the lower courts remain armed with tools sufficient to strike down 
novel applications of the new HUD regulations.159 
The Court will likely find that there is sufficient statistical evidence 
 
 153  “A plaintiff who fails to allege facts at the pleading stage or produce statistical 
evidence demonstrating a causal connection cannot make out a prima facie case of 
disparate impact.”  Id. 
 154  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 155  Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523. (“For instance, a plaintiff 
challenging the decision of a private developer to construct a new building in one 
location rather than another will not easily be able to show this is a policy causing a 
disparate impact because such a one-time decision may not be a policy at all.”) 
 156  Id. at 2524.  
 157  Id. at 2525.   
 158  Epps, supra note 142. 
 159  Id.  
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for a claim of disparate impact in Winfield.  At the pleading stage, the 
standard does not require probability, but rather plausibility.160  While 
a “robust” causal connection is required under Inclusive Communities, 
Plaintiffs have not asserted bare allegations.  Plaintiffs’ statistics 
illustrate general patterns of racial imbalances in the City, but they also 
evidence patterns of segregation that align with, and may have been 
caused in part by, the community preference policy.  There is a 
reduced probability that a low-income resident may obtain a unit in a 
preferred affordable housing district, and this provides a compelling 
nexus of fact.  Plaintiffs may not address all evils of segregation, but 
they certainly address an obvious one.  Even the barest factual 
assertion, that all people cannot access all of New York City’s 
neighborhoods, is troubling enough to permit this case to proceed for 
further discovery.  Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs may need to present 
additional data that firmly asserts causation if they intend to show that 
this policy is a “politically convenient arrangement that ensures Black, 
White, and Latino neighborhoods will stay as segregated as they 
currently are”161 and defeat Kennedy’s robust causality requirement 
and with it, the City. 
C. New HUD Regulations 
On February 15, 2013, while the Department’s appeal was 
pending, the Secretary of HUD issued a “new” regulation entitled the 
“Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard.”162  This long-awaited ruling proclaimed a national standard 
and “formalize[d] the longstanding interpretation of the Fair Housing 
Act to include discriminatory effects liability and established[d] a 
uniform standard of liability for facially neutral practices that have a 
discriminatory effect.”163  The legislative history of the FHA makes clear 
that residential integration and the advancement of equal housing 
opportunity are the Act’s main goals,164 and therefore the Supreme 
Court followed accordingly and ruled in Inclusive Communities as it did.  
Although housing discrimination remains a visible problem in the 
United States, it now takes more subtle forms than it once did.  If 
 
 160  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 161  Errol Louis, Community Preferences Discriminate, NYU FURMAN CTR. (Nov. 2015), 
http://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/community-preferences-discriminate. 
 162  78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013).  
 163  Id. at 11479. 
 164  Senator Walter Mondale, the Act’s lead sponsor, explained at Senate debates 
that the “the broad purpose of the Act was to replace segregated neighborhoods with 
‘truly integrated and balanced living patterns’ . . . and ‘undo the effects of these past’ 
discriminatory actions.”  Id. at 11467. 
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parties cannot point to a “smoking gun” example of NIMBYism, the 
disparate impact standard is an important tool that helps ensure that 
cities and towns across the United States integrate their residential 
communities.165 
The HUD rule, in correlation with the Supreme Court’s holding, 
establishes a three-part burden shifting test to determine whether a 
practice with a discriminatory effect violates the FHA.166  First, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proving its prima facie case that a practice 
results in or may predictably result in, a discriminatory effect on the 
basis of a protected characteristic, such as race.167  Second, if the 
plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the 
defendant to prove that this challenged practice is necessary to 
accomplish one or more legitimate, substantial, non-discriminatory 
interests.168  Finally, if the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff 
can still establish liability if he can prove that the legitimate, 
substantial, non-discriminatory practice could be accomplished by a 
practice that has a less discriminatory effect.169 
Inclusive Communities was on appeal amidst HUD’s declaration. 
The case was not decided upon, nor does it directly address, the HUD 
rule.170  Therefore, how the HUD rule is enacted will be shaped by the 
decisions of lower courts as they interpret the Supreme Court’s recent 
ruling. Taking into account the Court’s restrictions on the application 
of this theory, the enforceability of disparate impact liability as 
provided by the HUD rule may be in doubt.171 
V. LOOKING FORWARD 
At any time in the coming months, the Winfield lawsuit could be 
settled, dismissed, or tried.  How this case should be decided, however, 
presents a more interesting debate.  The following section attempts to 
understand what the most practical and progressive course should be 
 
 165  Joseph D. Rich, HUD’s New Discriminatory Effects Regulation: Adding Strength and 
Clarity to Efforts to End Residential Segregation, LAW. COMMITTEE FOR C.R. UNDER L. 6 (May 
2013), http://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HUDs-New-
Discriminatory-Effects-Regulation.pdf.  
 166  78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013). 
 167  Id. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id.  
 170  Kathleen A. Birrane, Inclusive Communities: Supreme Court recognizes disparate-
impact claims under FHA-implications for property insurers, DLA PIPER (July 8, 2015), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/northamerica/insights/publications/2015/07/inclus
ive-communities/. 
 171  Id.  
HART  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017  1:07 PM 
904 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:881 
for the community preference policy.  At the heart of this matter are 
the initial and current justifications for the community preference 
policy.  Therefore, by comparing similar cases in other jurisdictions, as 
well as the underlying issues facing New York City, this Comment will 
argue that the policy, though far from perfect, should be spared, but 
also substantially modified, if the City intends to retain it. 
The three-part burden-shifting framework172 the Inclusive 
Communities Court adopted from HUD creates a mechanism to remove 
“artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” that “function unfairly 
to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods without any 
sufficient justification.”173  With the adequate statistical analysis to 
illustrate that the community is less diverse than the surrounding area, 
it should be relatively easy for a plaintiff to show a disparate impact, 
and thus that a policy causes a greater harm to a protected class than 
to others.  Massachusetts District Court Judge Gertner exposes the 
reason for this in her opinion in Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority, 
a case comparable in some ways to Winfield.174  There is an “overarching 
intuitive principle here: where a community has a smaller proportion 
of minority residents than does the larger geographical area from 
which it draws applicants, the selection process that favors its residents 
cannot but work a disparate impact on minorities.”175  Likewise, the 
Winfield Plaintiffs easily point to basic statistical data to confirm the 
disparate impact on minority residents.  Inclusive Communities creates 
tension about how easy this truly is, but given the racial makeup of the 
 
 172  The burden shifting framework is as follows: 1) burden on plaintiff to make 
prima facie showing of disparate impact; 2) if satisfied, burden shifts to defendant to 
show “legally sufficient justification” (a) practice is necessary to achieve one or more 
substantial, legitimate, non-discriminatory interests; (b) interest could not be served 
by less discriminatory practice; (c) justification must be supported by evidence, not 
speculative.); 3) if satisfied, plaintiff has burden to show that interests could be served 
by a different practice with a less discriminatory effect. See supra Part IV.C; Harry J. 
Kelly & Michael W. Skojec, Disparate Impact Developments After the Inclusive Communities 
Decision, NAT’L AFFORDABLE HOUSING MGMT. ASS’N (2015), http://www.nahma.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Disparate-Impact-Presentation-NAHMA-Meeting-Oct-
2015.pdf.   
 173  Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2522 (2015). 
 174  Although Langlois is a Massachusetts District Court opinion, the facts create an 
analogous setting.  The plaintiffs, four racial minority, lower income women, 
challenged Section 8 rental assistance residency requirement on the grounds that it 
discriminated against minorities and did not “affirmatively further fair housing.”  See 
Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 175  Robert G. Schwemm, The Community Preference Policy: An Unnecessary Barrier to 
Minorities’ Housing Rights, NYU FURMAN CTR. (Nov. 2015), http://furmancenter.org/ 
research/iri/essay/the-community-preference-policy-an-unnecessary-barrier-to-
minorities-housin (quoting Langlois, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 62). 
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City’s neighborhoods, the court will likely be able to focus instead on 
steps two and three. 
Once Plaintiffs meet their burden, the City will then have to show 
a “legally sufficient justification” for the challenged policy; this 
justification cannot be speculative, but rather, it must be supported by 
evidence.176  There are essentially two interrelated justifications at play: 
first, to protect local residents from being displaced by gentrification; 
and second, to maintain the “fabric” of the neighborhood and the 
stability that is associated with that.177 
A. Gentrification 
Gentrification and displacement are the “new frontier of racial 
exclusion,” and continue to drive re-segregation.178  The dislodgment 
of individuals and disruption of communities disconnects people from 
their families, support systems, workplaces, houses of worship, and 
other important features of a community.179  Gentrification is not 
created by construction of affordable housing units, but instead by the 
flood of high-income individuals to a community.  The influx of 
primarily white professionals does not automatically create integrated 
neighborhoods; rather, it simply replaces local residents and deprives 
long-time residents of the stake they have built in their community.180  
In that sense, the community preference policy does not touch on the 
true cause of gentrification.181  Therefore, some scholars question 
whether the community preference has less of an effect on 
gentrification, and instead simply allows the City to maintain a 
“politically convenient status quo.”182 
The community preference policy was originally adopted in the 
 
 176  24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (b)(ii)(2) (2017). 
 177  See Schwemm, supra note 175. 
 178  Sam Tepperman-Gelfant, Local Preferences Requires Local Analysis, NYU FURMAN 
CTR. (November 2015), http://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/local-
preferences-require-local-analysis.  There is research to confirm that as opportunities 
increase in urban neighborhoods, minority populations are essentially treated as 
refugees and are driven out to suburbs and exurbs with fewer opportunities.  “For 
example, between 1990 and 2010, San Francisco and Oakland lost thirty-five percent 
of their African-American residents–84,000 people–while the overall population grew 
by nine percent; and in Silicon Valley, African-Americans declined by forty-six percent 
while the region grew by sixteen percent.”  Often times this data is marked by city-wide 
data.  Id.  For instance, between 2000 and 2013, the Mission District in San Francisco, 
lost twenty-seven percent of its Latino population even though the city’s overall Latino 
population rose by thirteen percent.  Id.  
 179  Id. 
 180  Id.  
 181  See Louis, supra note 161.  
 182  Id.  
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1980s—at a time when the City struggled to improve conditions and 
suffered from disinvestment—in response to the demands of local, low-
income residents who sought to remain in their neighborhoods.183  The 
City cited that its goal is to help particular areas retain their traditional 
cultural identities.184  Therefore, it is troubling that the City appears to 
have cited a goal of its policy, but failed to proffer evidence that it is 
actively working to complete this objective.  If the City cites that its goal 
is to keep residents in their original communities, that merely defines 
what a residency preference is rather than actually justifying or 
explaining why New York City needs this policy to achieve its goal.  
Judge Gertner questioned the rationale of residency preferences by 
stating, “if I accepted these as legitimate justifications, residency 
preferences in and of themselves would forever justify the disparate 
impacts that they cause.”185 
Instead, the City must produce a record of local conditions to 
explain why this practice is necessary.186  As the second step of the HUD 
regulation and Inclusive Communities requires, the City cannot assume 
or simply state this policy works, but must instead show that it does.187  
If the Plaintiffs truly can make out their prima facie case, they may be 
well-positioned to illuminate the flaws of this program.  One critique 
of this policy is that the City has never reviewed it.188  Therefore, if the 
City chose to review this policy, and corroborate it with statistical data 
about shifting populations and demographics of the city, perhaps it 
would be easy to prove that this policy has advanced and continues to 
realize its goal.  Even if the City can show this, however, it will have to 
prove that there is not a less discriminatory means to achieve it.  
Although the Langlois opinion required an event that truly hit the 
community “hard,”189 a strong case can be made that a simple showing 
of displacement and the ill-effects it has on a community and the 
autonomy of local residents may be sufficient. 
 
 
 
 183  See Cestero, supra note 12. 
 184  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 164. 
 185  Schwemm, supra note 175 (quoting Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. 
Supp. 2d 33, 70 (D. Mass. 2002)). 
 186  See also Langlois, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 70. 
 187  78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013). 
 188  See generally Compl., supra note 1. 
 189  See Langlois, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 70 n.41. 
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B. Stability of the Community 
The community preference policy has evolved such that it now 
also serves a goal closely related to curbing the ill effects of 
gentrification: maintaining stability in the community.  “The 
community preference policy reflects a belief that redevelopment is 
not just about building affordable housing, but about building 
communities.  To rebuild the fabric of a neighborhood, it is essential 
to start with the people who are there.”190  Residents that remained in 
certain neighborhoods while their community suffered hardship, 
whether by choice or out of necessity, are entitled to enjoy and 
participate in the redevelopment of their home and communities.  
Although the City may have a legitimate interest in stability, does the 
City proffer enough evidence that their program does this?191  All 
things considered, the fact that New York City has maintained this 
policy for twenty-five years, but failed to evaluate it and show evidence 
of progress, is especially disconcerting.192 
Errol Louis raised another interesting point in this debate: do 
segregated “fabrics” truly have any right to be preserved “whole cloth,” 
or is there an affirmative obligation on the City to ensure that this does 
not occur?193  The FHA requires that no person be discriminated 
against in regard to housing, and even promotes an affirmative 
mandate to foster integration.194  Therefore, any policy that works the 
same ill-effect on a macro level should be equally as suspect. 
C. Less Discriminatory Alternatives 
Even if the practice is necessary to achieve the substantial, 
legitimate, and non-discriminatory objective of reduced gentrification 
and increased community stability, the City will also have to show that 
these interests could not be served by less discriminatory practices.195  
The City has not evaluated this policy; notably, the last time it modified 
this practice, the purpose was to increase the percentage.196  Although 
much of this discussion points to the need to eliminate this policy all 
together, this second step of the burden shifting analysis offers an 
 
 190  See Cestero, supra note 12.  
 191  See Schwemm, supra note 175. 
 192  Id. 
 193  See Louis, supra note 161.  
 194  42 U.S.C. § 3608 (1978). 
 195  78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013).  
 196  Laura Kusisto, City Housing Rules Examined, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/hud-reviews-new-york-city-affordable-housing-policy-
1424399380. 
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opportunity to review possible alterations to the policy that may offer 
a favorable compromise to both parties.  Ultimately, the City wants to 
figure out a way to balance a stable community without unduly 
restricting individual choice and mobility. 
First, it would be wise of the City to narrow the reach of this policy.  
The City increased the percentage, and therefore a simple solution 
would be to reduce the percentage back to thirty percent or perhaps 
even lower. 
Second, the City may choose to use this policy in certain 
neighborhoods, and not others.197  The major concern here is that this 
policy keeps neighborhoods segregated.  Therefore, minority citizens, 
who are perhaps least financially equipped to deal, are forced to carry 
the burden of this imperfection.  The consequences of this often last 
for generations.  If this policy was retained in rapidly gentrifying 
neighborhoods, it would slow displacement that is caused by 
gentrification, while simultaneously maintaining the integrity of the 
community.  Moreover, if this policy is rescinded in primarily white 
neighborhoods, residents such as the Plaintiffs would be given a more 
equal opportunity to move into the neighborhoods of opportunity they 
expressed an interest in.  Plaintiffs have alleged significant statistical 
data that evidences the policy is racially isolating.  On the other hand, 
this policy helps to preserve communities by creating options for low-
income residents to stay in their neighborhoods.  The policy is not 
perfect, but it also serves an important purpose.  The policy prevents 
displacement, but also contributes to harmful segregation.  Therefore, 
a compromise between these objectives is most appealing.  The court 
in Langlois looked favorably upon this “tempered approach [that] 
would still help support local residents in their efforts to maintain their 
residencies in the defendant communities, while at the same time 
keeping the strategy from running afoul of the fair housing 
requirement of no disparate impact.”198 
Third, the City may narrow the policy by including a restriction 
based on length of residency in a community.  Currently, a person who 
moves in and establishes residency one day before the lottery has the 
same chance as someone who has lived in a certain community for 
generations.199  Because this policy is intended to protect established 
residents, such a change would reduce the overall contest for 
protected units, and likely allow the percentage to be reduced while 
 
 197  Schwemm, supra note 175. 
 198  See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 70 (D. Mass. 2002); 
Schwemm, supra note 175. 
 199  Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 92. 
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maintaining the desired outcome. 
Fourth, the people given priority can and should be changed 
depending on the true needs of the community.  For example, local 
low-income workers, rather than only residents, may be given 
preference.200  In addition, where displacement has occurred, former 
residents may be given preference along with current residents.201  This 
would once again call on the City to evaluate its policy, but this sort of 
project would be well worth its cost. 
If the City meets its burden and shows that less discriminatory 
alternatives will not achieve its goal, the burden would shift back to the 
Plaintiffs to show that their interests could be served by a different 
practice with a less discriminatory effect.  Any of these suggestions 
discussed could be further modified to strike a favorable compromise. 
To narrow the policy is one approach; however, that is not enough 
to solve all the problems the City faces.  The City will have to 
implement and improve other policies.  The community preference 
policy can only succeed, even if transformed, if used in conjunction 
with supplemental policies to encourage safe and secure 
neighborhoods of opportunity for low-income citizens.  For example, 
cities also should re-evaluate policies, including “rent control and just 
cause eviction, minimum wages and middle-wage job creation, training 
and career pathways for people with barriers to employment, local 
business preservation, restrictions on conversion of apartments into 
condominiums or hotels, community-directed infrastructure 
investments, and affordable housing production strategies, to name a 
few.”202 
If the court does find a disparate impact violation, the remedy 
must “concentrate on the elimination of the offending practice, and 
courts should strive to design race-neutral remedies,” or better yet, 
alternatives.203 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 200  See Tepperman-Gelfant, supra note 178.  
 201  See id.  
 202  Id. 
 203  Texas Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2507, 2512 (2015). 
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EPILOGUE 
On October 24, 2016, The Honorable Laura Taylor Swain of the 
Southern District of New York responded to the defendant’s motion.  
As predicted, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), and held that the Plaintiffs do not 
lack standing to challenge the City policy and have not failed to state a 
claim.204 
I. STANDING: 
The court held that standing may be granted to anyone “who 
believes he ‘will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is 
about to occur’” and therefore a “‘person who is likely to suffer such 
an injury need not wait until a discriminatory effect has been felt 
before bringing a suit.’”205  A threatened injury is cognizable.206  The 
City did not even dispute that the “missed opportunity to compete for 
[] housing on an equal footing with the local residents” could 
constitute a cognizable injury for the purposes of standing, but instead, 
contended that the City itself did not cause this injury to the 
Plaintiffs.207 
The court cited to Comer, and noted that the Plaintiffs’ injury 
relates to the denial of the “opportunity to compete on equal footing 
for fair housing in their desired neighborhoods, rather than from the 
failure to achieve a successful result in any particular lottery.”208  “The 
injury is not the failure to obtain housing assistance in the suburbs, but 
is the missed opportunity to compete for suburban housing on an 
equal footing with the residents.”209 
The court therefore held that Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to 
demonstrate that they “will be injured by a discriminatory house 
practice that is about to occur,”210 and have standing to proceed with 
their challenge of this policy.211 
 
 204  Winfield v. City of N.Y., No. 15CV5236-LTS-DCF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146919, 
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2016). 
 205  Id. at *8 (quoting LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 425 (2d Cir. 
1995)). 
 206  See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (1998). 
 207  Winfield, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146919, at *13–14 (citing Comer v. Cisneros, 37 
F.3d 775, 794 (2d Cir. 1994)).  
 208  Id. at *15. 
 209  Comer, 37 F.3d at 794. 
 210  42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (1988). 
 211  Winfield, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146919, at *16.  
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II. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM: 
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the City also asserted that the FAC 
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.212  To survive a motion 
to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”213 
A. Disparate Impact: 
In 2015, the Supreme Court recognized that disparate impact 
claims are cognizable under the FHA.214  “A prima facie case of 
disparate impact requires ‘(1) the occurrence of certain outwardly 
neutral practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate 
impact on persons of a particular type produced by the defendant’s 
facially neutral acts or practices.’”215  A party may prove a disparate 
impact claim by showing an adverse impact on a particular group or 
minority, or harm to the community generally by the perpetuation of 
segregation.216 
The court noted that Plaintiffs have alleged that there is 
“significant racial segregation” within New York City at various income 
levels and throughout various community districts.217  The court stated, 
“[t]here is an obvious causal link between a policy whose very purpose 
is to maintain the existing racial and ethnic makeup of local 
communities and the corresponding perpetuation of the racial and 
ethnic makeup of those communities.”218  In addition, the Plaintiffs 
alleged that “neighborhoods of opportunity” (i.e., Manhattan Districts 
5, 6, and 7) are disproportionately white.219 
The court held that such factual allegations: 
support plausibly the inference that the Community 
Preference Policy would operate to perpetuate residential 
segregation by, inter alia, giving a preference to local white 
applicants for housing in already disproportionately white 
community districts that have higher income levels and 
higher levels of services and benefits than community 
districts in which the existing residents are predominantly 
 
 212  Id. 
 213  Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).  
 214  Id. at *18 (citing Texas Dep’t of Hous. and Comm. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. 
Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015)).  
 215  Id. at *18–19 (quoting Mhany Mgmt. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 617 (2d 
Cir. 2016)).  
 216  Id. (citing Catanzaro v. Weiden, 188 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 1999)).   
 217  Winfield, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146919, at *20–21. 
 218  Id. 
 219  Id. at *21. 
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minority group members.220 
Although discovery may prove that eliminating this policy may 
have no impact on the racial composition of affordable housing 
applicants, the court held that Plaintiffs have plausibly plead disparate 
impact and that is all that is required at this stage.221  “[T]hey are not 
required to prove causation or disparate impact through statistical 
evidence at the pleading stage.”222 
The court held that the Plaintiffs met their burden of showing 
that it was plausible that the Community Preference policy perpetuates 
segregation.223 
B. Disparate Treatment 
Discriminatory intent may be “inferred from the totality of the 
relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more 
heavily on one race than another.”224  Plaintiffs can demonstrate a 
prima facie case of disparate treatment “by showing that animus 
against the protected group was a significant factor in the position 
taken by the municipal decision-makers themselves or by those to 
whom the decision-makers were knowingly responsive.”225 
The court held that, read in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiffs, the FAC sufficiently pleads facts that permit an inference of 
discriminatory intent.226  As the court found that Plaintiffs plausibly 
alleged disparate impact caused by the policy, this factor weighed in 
favor of also finding discriminatory intent.227  The court noted the 
City’s historic discriminatory policies cited in the Complaint as well as 
more recent examples of unequal treatment of white and black 
neighborhoods.228  Taken together, Plaintiffs allegations that this policy 
is racially motivated and that the City has withheld information to 
assess the policy, are sufficient for them to plead a plausible disparate 
treatment claim.229 
 
 220  Id. (citing Compl., supra note 1, ¶¶ 7, 117–18, 176–77). 
 221  Id. 
 222  Winfield, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146919, at *22. 
 223  Id. at *22.  
 224  Id. (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)) (“Because 
discriminatory intent is rarely susceptible to direct proof, a district court facing a 
question of discriminatory intent must make a ‘sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.’”).  
 225  Id. at *23 (quoting Mhany, 819 F.3d at 606). 
 226  Id. at *24. 
 227  Id. 
 228  Id. (citing Compl., supra note 1, ¶¶ 3, 25–30; 143–44) 
 229  Id. at *25–26.  The Court also held that the Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded their 
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